Once More into the Breach: The Peremptory Challenge After Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. by Bunting, Gerald A. & Reardon, Lesley A.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 7 
Issue 1 Volume 7, Fall 1991, Issue 1 Article 24 
September 1991 
Once More into the Breach: The Peremptory Challenge After 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 
Gerald A. Bunting 
Lesley A. Reardon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Bunting, Gerald A. and Reardon, Lesley A. (1991) "Once More into the Breach: The Peremptory Challenge 
After Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 7 : Iss. 
1 , Article 24. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol7/iss1/24 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ONCE MORE INTO THE BREACH: THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AFTER EDMONSON
v. LEES VILLE CONCRETE CO.
The Constitution guarantees certain civil litigants the right to
have their cases heard before a jury.' In the furtherance of jus-
tice, the law requires that the jury be impartial.2 To ensure the
vitality of this interest, the peremptory challenge was created by
statute' as a nonconstitutional4 device whereby litigants may re-
move, at voir dire,5 potential jurors suspected of bias.' Federal
U.S. CONS'r. amend. VII. "[I]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P.
38. "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." Id.;
see also Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) (right to jury trial is basic and funda-
mental right of our system of jurisprudence protected by Seventh Amendment).
2 See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1965). The Seventh Amend-
ment preserves the right to a jury trial for civil matters, but unlike the Sixth Amendment,
it does not expressly provide for jury impartiality. Id. The impartiality of the jury "is inher-
ent in the requirement of the fifth amendment that '[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law'." Id.; see also McDonough Power
Equip. Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) (plurality opinion) (stating that "[ojne
touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact").
28 U.SC. § 1870 (1988). "In civil cases each party shall be entitled to three peremptory
challenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for
the purposes of making challenges, or the court may allow additional challenges .... " Id.
' See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988) (peremptory challenges not required by
Constitution); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 663 (1987) ("[p]eremptory challenges are
not of constitutional origin"); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (establish-
ing that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally required); see also United States v.
Meredith, 824 F.2d 1418, 1423 n.2 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting argument that additional
peremptory challenges are required in multi-defendant cases), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 969
(1988). But see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (peremptory challenge "is one
of the most important of the rights secured to the accused") (citing Pointer v. United
States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (right
of challenge originates from common law with right of trial by jury). See generally Kathe-
rine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry
and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 815 (1989) (party using perempto-
ries is exercising right created by state).
I See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990). Voir dire is the term which "de-
notels] the preliminary examination which the court and attorneys make of prospective
jurors to determine their qualification and suitability to serve as jurors." Id. It is during
voir dire that the attorneys exercise their right to challenge the prospective juror. JON M.
VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE
PANELS 139 (1977).
' See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). The Court stated that "[clompetence
to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and
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rules allow civil litigants a total of three peremptory challenges.
Although peremptory challenges may be exercised without a
stated reason, 7 a challenge for cause requires a specified bias in
order to be sustained."
In recent years, the peremptory challenge has come under siege
by those who view it as a means of perpetuating racial discrimina-
tion in the judicial system." Because the peremptory challenge is
ability impartially to consider evidence presented at trial." Id. (citing Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946)); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). The
Court in Swain noted that the purpose of the peremptory challenge is "not only to elimi-
nate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before
whom they will try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them,
and not otherwise." Id.; see also VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 139 n.1 (consensus that all
jurors possess some types of biases founded on their own personal- experiences).
Blackstone has called the peremptory challenge an "arbitrary and capricious species of
challenge", but concluded that "the law wills not [that a defendant] ... be tried by any one
man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to assign a reason
for such dislike." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353.
There has been much discourse regarding the continued viability of the peremptory
challenge in view of its potential for abuse. See generally Glen T. Johnson, The Use of Pe-
remptory Challenges to Exclude Blacks from Juries: An Overview, 10 S.U. L. REV. 35 (1983) (dis-
cussing role of peremptories in criminal system and constitutional issues involved);
Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half-Step in the Right Direction, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 1026 (1987) (calling for elimination of peremptory challenge to ensure constitu-
tional protection of minorities); Patricia E. Sacks, Note, Challenging the Peremptory Chal-
lenge: Sixth Amendment Implications of the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 67
WASH. U.L.Q 547 (1989) (discussing Sixth Amendment claims in regard to use of
peremptories).
In addition to the peremptory challenge, there also exists the challenge for cause, which
may only be exercised on statutory grounds. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. Both serve the
same purpose and are employed by both sides at the voir dire stage. Id. The Swain opinion
noted that a challenge for cause is founded upon "a narrowly specified, provable and le-
gally cognizable basis of partiality." Id. In contrast, use of the peremptory challenge is
prompted by the exerciser's subjective perception of the suspect juror or is based upon the
"sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare
looks and gestures of another." Id. (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376
(1892)): see also Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir. 1991) ("grimace or
stare may express hostility or displeasure quite as clearly as words shouted across a room"),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991). The peremptory challenge "permits rejection for a real
or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable." Swain, 380 U.S. at
220 (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1870)).
See supra note 6.
28 U.SC. § 1870 (1988); see supra note 3 (quoting section 1870 in part). The remaining
part of section 1870 states that "[aill challenges for cause or favor, whether to the array or
panel or to individual jurors, shall be determined by the court." 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988).
' See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1369-70 (1991). The Court has consistently ad-
dressed, for more than a century, the subject of racism in the jury system. Id.; see also
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (purposeful racial discrimination in venire se-
lection violates defendant's right to equal protection); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
537 (1975) (right to impartial jury includes jury pool drawn from fair cross-section of com-
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exercised without a reason, it is often subject to abuse by those
who "have a mind to discriminate.- 10 In response, courts have fol-
lowed two separate and distinct approaches."1
Originally, litigants argued that discriminatory use of the pe-
remptory challenge violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to
a fair and impartial jury. 2 The Supreme Court determined that
munity): Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co. Inc., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) (individual's race is unrelated to his fitness as juror); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
130 (1940). The Smith Court held that "for racial discrimination to result in the exclusion
from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the
laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government." Id.; see also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881) (de-
liberate exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries violates black defendant's constitu-
tional rights): Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880) (discriminatory exclusion from
jury service impairs defendant's right to impartial jury); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (statutory exclusion of blacks from jury service violated black defend-
ant's right to equal protection); cf Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 474 (defendant is
entitled to impartial jury, not representative jury), rehr'g denied, 494 U.S. 1050 (1990);
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 314-15 (1989) (no requirement that petit jury mirror com-
munity and reflect various groups in population); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174
(1986) (to require petit juries to represent fair cross-section of community would be "un-
workable and unsound").
" Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)); see also
Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (peremptory challenge may be exer-
cised "without reason or for no reason, arbitrarily and capriciously").
" See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975) (jury venire may be examined
under Sixth Amendment analysis); see also Laurie Magid, Challenges to Jury Composition:
Purging the Sixth Amendment Analysis of Equal Protection Concepts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1081,
1087 (1987). But see Holland, 493 U.S. at 482-83 (Sixth Amendment does not bar race-
based peremptory strikes), rehr'g denied, 494 U.S. 1050 (1990).
The second approach against racially discriminatory strikes used the Equal Protection
Clause. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89: Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965). See
generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Chal-
lenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 168 (1989).
" See Holland, 493 U.S. at 474 (Sixth Amendment guarantee of impartial jury does not
prevent discriminatory use of race-based peremptory challenges), The Sixth Amendment
route has turned out to be a dead-end with respect to peremptory challenges. Id. The
Holland Court noted: "A prohibition upon the exclusion of cognizable groups through pe-
remptory challenges has no conceivable basis in the test of the Sixth Amendment ...." Id.
at 478. "To say that the Sixth Amendment deprives the state of the ability to 'stack the
deck' in its favor is not to say that each side may not, once a fair hand is dealt, use peremp-
tory challenges to eliminate prospective jurors belonging to groups it believes would un-
duly favor the other side." Id. at 481; see, e.g., Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 ("absence of a fair
cross section on the jury venire does not undermine .. .fundamental fairness"); Lockhart,
476 U.S. at 178 (exclusion of persons from jury service on basis of viewpoint, politics, or
ideology would not violate Sixth Amendment); Debra L. Dippel, Note, Holland v. Illinois:
Sixth Amendment Fair Cross-Section Requirement Does Not Preclude Racially-Based Peremptory
Challenges, 24 AKRON L. REV 177, 184 (1990). But see Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-
37 (1986) (refusal of trial judge to inquire about possible racial prejudice violated defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment rights at penalty phase of capital trial); Alschuler, supra note 11, at
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this guarantee included a jury venire drawn from a fair cross-sec-
tion of the community. 13 However, the Court later ruled in Hol-
land v. Illinois' that this guarantee did not entitle a party to a
petit jury which mirrored the racial composition of the commu-
nity. 5 Thus, the Court curtailed Sixth Amendment attacks on
race-based peremptories.16
The second approach was premised on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Litigants argued that dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges violated both their own
equal protection rights 8 and those of the challenged jurors."
159 (criticizing minimal inquiry made regarding race prejudice in jury selection).
As it stands, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury drawn from a represen-
tative cross-section of the community as reflected in the venire. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
Defendants, however, are not entitled to a petit jury that mirrors the racial composition of
the community. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 478; United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224
(2d Cir. 1950), affid, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The rationale for the fair cross-section rule was
that jury composition affected its partiality. Id.; see also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04
(1972) (exclusion of identifiable group from jury results in loss of differing perspectives of
"unsuspected importance").
The notion that a fair cross-section requirement precludes race-based peremptories en-
dures in some states, where the state constitution embodies such a clause. See People v.
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 750 (Cal. 1978) (state constitution guarantees representative cross
section injury); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 500 (Mass. 1979) (same); State
v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1151 (N.J. 1986) (same).
'3 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
14 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
'6 Id. at 477.
16 Id. at 480-81.
' US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section I provides in part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
Cases applying the Equal Protection Clause to the jury system date back to Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880). See supra note 8. While the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable only to actions of the state, it has been
held to apply to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Consequently, the Constitution
may be invoked through either state or federal government action. Id.; see also United
States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1976) (same). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1688 (2d ed. 1988) (state action doctrine); Har-
old C. Strickland, The State Action and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 587,
643 (1991) (reviewing state action decisions of Rehnquist Court).
The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part: "No person . . .shall be ... deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... " U.S CONST. amend V.
"8 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2079-80 (1991).
19 Id.
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Courts have adopted this approach, thereby restricting the use of
the peremptory challenge.20
In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in Batson v. Kentucky,21 that a
state prosecutor's use of racially motivated peremptory challenges
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 2 Batson required that the
defendant first make a prima facie showing that the challenge was
based on race.23 If such a showing was made, the burden shifted
to the state to provide a race-neutral explanation. 24 The court
would then evaluate the neutrality of the proffered explanation. 25
22 See id. at 2080: Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
21 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
22 Id. at 84-85. Batson, a black criminal defendant, was convicted by an all-white jury of
second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. Id. at 82. Batson claimed that the pros-
ecutor had intentionally used all four of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from
the jury. Id. at 83-84.
The key aspect of Batson was that it overturned the evidentiary requirements set forth in
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1965). In Swain, a black defendant was convicted
of rape in Talledega County, Alabama, and sentenced to death. Id. at 203. Although the
petit jury venires in Talledega County included an average of seven blacks, no black had
served on a petit jury since 1950. Id. at 205. The prosecution in Swain had used its peremp-
tory strikes to eliminate all blacks on the venire. Id. at 210. The Court held that even if the
exclusion of blacks from the venire raised a prima-facie case of discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the petitioner was required to show that the prosecutor systemat-
ically excluded blacks over time, and not just at that particular trial. Id. at 224. The de-
fendant was unable to meet this burden and his claim was rejected. Id. at 221-22.
However, in Batson the Court relaxed this evidentiary burden and laid down explicit
ground rules for prosecutorial use of peremptory strikes. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. The
defendant can make a prima-facie showing of discrimination in the use of peremptory chal-
lenges "relying solely on the facts ...in his case." Id. at 95. Furthermore:
[Tihe defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group
and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the
venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on
the fact .. .that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that per-
mits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate'. Finally, the defendant
must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury
on account of their race.
Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). Once a defendant satisfied
these requirements, the burden shifted to the state to affirmatively show that there were
non-racial grounds for the challenges. Id. at 97.
Although Batson involved state prosecution and the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same limitations are imposed on federal prosecutors through the Fifth
Amendment. See United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 104 n.1 (4th Cir. 1989).
" Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
2 Id. at 97-98.
" Id. at 98; see Sumlin v. Moore, 583 So. 2d 1320, 1321 (Ala. 1991) (once race-neutral
explanation is proffered, movant may come forward with evidence to show given explana-
tions were pretextual).
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For the next several years courts were divided as to whether
Batson should apply in civil cases since private litigants, unlike
state prosecutors, were not clearly state actors.2 " This issue was
resolved by the Supreme Court decision in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co." which held that private civil litigants were precluded
from using race as the basis for a peremptory challenge.28
Part One of this Note provides the procedural background of
Edmonson and analyzes Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. Part
Two will examine the application of Batson v. Kentucky to peremp-
tory challenges in criminal actions. Part Three of this Note will
discuss the possible expansion, under equal protection principles,
of the Batson-Edmonson doctrine as a further limitation on the dis-
criminatory use of the peremptory challenge. This Note will con-
clude that the utility of the peremptory challenge has been so di-
minished by constitutional limitations that it should be abolished.
I. ANALYSIS OF Edmonson
A. Procedural Background
In Edmonson, the petitioner, a black man, brought a negligence
action against his employer in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana.29 During voir dire, the respon-
dent used two of its peremptory challenges to remove two black
persons from the venire, and the third to remove a white per-
son."0 The judge denied petitioner's request for an explanation of
See Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 823 (11th Cir.) (Batson applies to civil cases), cert.
denied sub nom. Tiller v. Fludd, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); Clark v. Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp.
890, 895 (D. Conn. 1986) (applying Batson to racially-motivated strikes used by assistant
city attorney in civil trial); cf. Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Ill.), vacated
sub nom. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1988) (district judge should have
allowed trial to continue and have losing party raise Batson issue on appeal). But see Wilson
v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 164-65 (8th Cir. 1988) (dicta indicating unlikely Batson was in-
tended to apply to civil actions); Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Conn.
1986) (Batson inapplicable to civil matters).
27 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 2080-81. Edmonson was employed at a construction site located at Fort Polk,
Louisiana. Id. at 2080. He was injured when one of Leesville's trucks rolled backwards and
pinned him against some equipment. Id. Federal jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1310 (5th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
30 Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1310.
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the strikes and ruled that Batson did not apply to civil cases."
Thereafter, a twelve-member jury comprised of eleven whites and
one black, heard the case and rendered a verdict for the plain-
tiff.32 Although the jury found Edmonson sustained damages of
$90,000, they awarded him only $18,000, finding him eighty per-
cent contributorily negligent.3
On appeal, Edmonson argued that Leesville's alleged racially
motivated use of its peremptory challenges entitled him to a new
trial. 4 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court,36 but at a re-
hearing en banc,38 affirmed the district court's finding that Batson
did not apply to civil actions. 7 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari38 and reversed the Fifth Circuit. 9
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,'0 found that the de-
fendant's racially motivated peremptory challenges constituted
"state action""' in violation of the Equal Protection Clause,'
thereby permitting application of Batson."3 The Court concluded
that a party in a civil case had sufficient standing to raise the ex-
cluded jurors' equal protection claims on his own behalf,44and
held that the jurors' equal protection rights under the Fifth
Amendment had been abridged.'5
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
S" Id. at 1308. "If racially-motivated challenges are exercised by both parties, the rem-
edy is not to condone them but to insist, when objection is made, that the guarantee of
equal protection against all racial prejudice is enforced," d. at 1314.
" Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 1I S. Ct.
2077 (1991).
" Id. Writing for the majority, Judge Gee stated that "if governmental action is not
present, then the courts hold no warrant to interfere, in the name of equal protection, with
the system of civil peremptory challenges." Id. at 221.
3 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
" Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., I1I S. Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991).
40 Id. at 2080. Associate Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Souter joined
Justice Kennedy in the opinion. Id.
41 Id. at 2083-84.
42 Id. at 2087.
" Id. at 2088. Batson was decided on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, whereas Edmon-
son was decided on Fifth Amendment grounds. See supra note 17.
44 Id. at 2087.
46 Id.
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B. The Majority Opinion
In extending Batson to a civil matter, the Court first had to cast
Leesville's use of the peremptory strike as "state action," a pre-
requisite to securing the protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.46 To accomplish this, the majority relied upon the two-part
analysis set forth in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.47 which outlined
the standards for determining state action. The first requirement
of Lugar was that the "source" of the privilege exercised have its
origin in state authority.48 Accordingly, since peremptory chal-
lenges were provided for by statute, the first prong of Lugar was
satisfied.49 The second element under Lugar involved the determi-
46 Id. at 2082. "[C]onstitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection do
not apply to the actions of private entities." Id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988)); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)
(Fourteenth Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however dis-
criminatory or -wrongful").
'" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Lugar based its determina-
tion on whether alleged deprivation of constitutional rights resulted from the exercise of a
right or privilege originating in state authority, and whether the private actor so charged
could be described as a state actor. Id.
" Edmonson, 1 I1 S. Ct. at 2083.
"9 Id. "In the federal system, Congress has established the qualifications for jury service,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1865, and has outlined the procedures by which jurors are selected ....
[Elach district court in the federal system must adopt a plan.for locating and summoning to
the court eligible prospective jurors." Id. at 2084. The Court continued:
The trial judge exercises substantial control over the voir dire in the federal system.
The judge determines the range of information that may be discovered about a pro-
spective juror, and so affects the exercise of both challenges for cause and peremp-
tory challenges. In some cases, judges may even conduct the entire voir dire by them-
selves, a common practice in the district court where the instant case was tried. The
judge oversees the exclusion of jurors for cause, in this way determining which ju-
rors remain eligible for the exercise of peremptory strikes.
Id. (citations omitted).
It is submitted that the Court, in holding that use of a peremptory strike constituted an
"extensive use of state procedures" distorted the role of the trial court. The opinion main-
tained that the federal court's role in establishing the qualifications and selection proce-
dures for jurors, and the involvement of the bench in voir dire equated "state action." Id.
In her dissenting opinion, justice O'Connor observed that "the establishment of qualifica-
tions for jury service, the location and summoning of prospective jurors, the jury wheel,
the voter lists, the jury qualification forms, the per diem for jury service-are independent
of the statutory entitlement to peremptory strikes, or of their use." Id. at 2090 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Additionally, the dissent stated, "the judge does not 'en-
courage' the use of a peremptory challenge .... The decision to strike... is entirely up to
the litigant, and the reasons for doing so are of no consequence to the judge." Id. The
dissent went on to say that "[t]he judge does little more than acquiesce in this decision by
excusing the juror." Id.
In highlighting the lack of significant state participation, Justice O'Connor stated that
336
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nation of whether a private party could be considered a "state ac-
tor."50 Towards this end, the Edmonson Court pursued an analysis
consisting of three inquiries: whether there was "overt, significant
assistance" to the private party by the government;5 1 whether the
act in question was a "traditional government function;"5 2 and
"[nlo one is compelled by government action to use a peremptory challenge, let alone use
it in a racially discriminatory way." Id. at 2091. The dissent also quoted Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974), for the proposition that an individual's use
of a state-provided choice, where the initiative is supplied by the individual, did not equal
state action. Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2091.
Supreme Court precedent is also clear that there must be a sufficient nexus between the
state and the discriminatory act in order for it to be attributable to the state. See National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 195 (1988) (state university's deci-
sion to adopt association rules did not transform association into state actor); Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (private entity which performs function pursuant
to governm~pt regulation to serve public not state actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1012 (1982) (decisions by administrators at state-funded nursing home not acts of state);
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981) (public defender not state actor);
Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-72 (1972) (private club not state actor by virtue of government-
issued liquor license). But see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (private physician who
contracted with state to provide medical services to prison is state actor); Dennis v. Sparks,
449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980) (private parties conspiring with judge were actors under color of
state law); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980) (state's conduct in tolerating
conflict of interest by privately-retained counsel was state action); Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (private actions "may become so entwined with governmental policies
or impregnated with a governmental character" that it can be considered state action);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (refusal to serve blacks in
restaurant located in public parking facility constituted state action).
50 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087 (state action analysis test). The court stated:
[Iln determining whether a particular action or course of conduct is governmental in
character, it is relevant to examine the following: the extent to which the actor relies
on governmental assistance and benefits, whether the actor is performing a tradi-
tional governmental function, and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a
unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.
Id. at 2083 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2084 (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478,
486 (1988)). The court stated:
[A] private party could not exercise its peremptory challenges absent the overt, sig-
nificant assistance of the court. The government summons jurors, constrains their
freedom of movement, and subjects them to public scrutiny and examination. The
party who exercises a challenge invokes the formal authority of the court, which
must discharge the prospective juror, thus effecting the 'final and practical denial' of
the excluded individual's opportunity to serve on the petit jury. Without the direct
and indispensable participation of the judge, who beyond all question is a state actor,
the peremptory challenge system would serve no purpose.
Id. at 2084-85 (citations omitted).
2 Id. at 2085. "The selection of jurors represents a unique governmental function dele-
gated to private litigants by the government and attributable to the government for pur-
poses of invoking constitutional protections against discrimination by reason of race." Id. at
2086.
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whether the "injury caused [was] aggravated in a unique way by
the incidents of governmental authority."" The majority was sat-
isfied that all three requirements were met, 4 and that under such
circumstances, a civil litigant was a state actor.55
In the second part of the decision, the Court set forth the basis
for allowing Edmonson to raise the excluded jurors' equal protec-
tion claim as his own.56 Applying the rules of third-party standing,
the Court stated that excluded jurors faced serious obstacles in
protecting their own rights, 57 and that the litigant may have estab-
lished a relationship or "bond" with the potential juror.58 As a
result, the Court concluded it would be proper for the civil liti-
gant to raise the rights of the excluded venireperson. 59 The Court
opined that this was appropriate since both the civil litigant and
the venireperson had a mutual interest in eradicating racial dis-
11 Id. at 2083. "Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea
of democratic government from becoming a reality." Id. at 2087 (citing Rose v. Mitchell,
443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)). "To permit racial exclusion in this official forum compounds
the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin." Id. at 2087.
14 Id. at 2085.
55 Id.
5I Id. at 2087. "[A] litigant may raise a claim on behalf of a third party if the litigant can
demonstrate that he or she has suffered a concrete redressable injury, that he or she has a
close relation with the third party, and that there exists some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests." Id.
Generally, litigants must assert their own legal rights and interests and "cannot rest a
claim to relief premised on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Powers v. Ohio,
111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991) (citing United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct.
1428 (1990)); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976); see also Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (ordinarily person is barred from challenging constitutionality of
state action by invoking rights of third parties).
This restriction is subject to limited exceptions. See Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370; see also
Secretary of State of Maryland v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (interests of third party are crucial). See generally Al-
schuler, supra note 11, at 193-94 (discussing third party rights and how they may be
asserted).
" Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087; see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 489, rehr'g
denied, 494 U.S. 1050 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). "[A] juror dismissed because of his
race will leave the courtroom with a lasting sense of exclusion from the experience of jury
participation, but possessing little incentive or resources to set in motion the arduous pro-
cess needed to vindicate his own rights." Id.
" Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087-88. "[V]oir dire permits a party to establish a relation, if
not a bond of trust, with the jurors." Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1372
(1991)).
51 Id. at 2088; see also United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1420 (1990) (govern-
ment has standing to assert equal protection rights of excluded juror), rehr'g granted, 930
F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1991).
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crimination from the courtroom. 0
II. Batson IN ACTION
The extension of Batson to civil cases could arguably complicate
and delay voir dire in civil suits.6 A review of how the Batson rule
has operated in federal and state criminal trials provides a preview
of what may be in store for civil litigants.
62
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
To demand a race-neutral explanation for peremptory chal-
lenges, the defendant must first establish a prima facie case of pur-
poseful discrimination.6" Under Batson, the formulation of a
prima facie case required the defendant to show that he was a
member of a cognizable racial group6' and that the peremptory
challenge was used to remove members of his race from the ve-
nire. 5 The defendant then had to show that "these facts and any
other relevant circumstances raise[d] an inference" that the prose-
cutor challenged the veniremen on racial grounds.66 If these fac-
00 Id.
"1 See James P. Connors, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Effect on the Civil Jury Selec-
tion Process, N.Y.L J., Aug. 9, 1991, at 1.
*z See infra text accompanying note 88.
0 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). Once the prima facie showing is made,
the state then has the burden to come forward with a race-neutral explanation. Id. But see
United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2623
(1990). In Clemmons, it was unclear to the circuit court whether or not the defendant had
actually made a prima facie showing of discrimination. Id. Nevertheless, the district court
demanded a neutral explanation from the prosecutor. Id. In reversing, the Third Circuit
held that the court "cannot effectively close their eyes" to an insufficient neutral explana-
tion despite the absence of a prima facie showing. Id.
Historically, the term "prima facie" .in instances of discrimination differs from the con-
ventional usage. United States v. Alvarado, 891 F.2d 439, 442 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 110 S. Ct. 2995 (1990). Under such circumstances "prima facie" has been
defined as a presentation of evidence sufficient to establish a "legally mandatory ir-
rebutable presumption." Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981)). A presumption in the context of a prima facie case makes it "more likely
than not" that the actions scrutinized were result of intentional discrimination. Id. at 442
n.2 (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). Ordinarily, "prima
facie" refers to a presentation of evidence that, as a matter of law, warrants "submission of
an issue for decision by the trier of fact." Id. at 442 (citing JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2494 (1. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981)).
6'4 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
" Id. (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1976)).
60 Id.
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tors were established, an inference of intentional discrimination
arose whereupon the government was required to provide a race-
neutral explanation for each of the challenged strikes.6 7
1. Membership in a "Cognizable Racial Group"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a cognizable racial group
determination requires: (1) that the class be definable and limited
by some clearly identifiable attribute;" (2) that a "common
thread" of ideas, attitudes, and experience run through the
group; 9 and (3) that there be a community of interest among the
"I Id. at 97. But see Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991) (where prose-
cutor provided race-neutral explanation and trial court ruled on its sufficiency, fact that
defendant had not yet made prima facie showing was moot).
11 See United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 1988) (Italian-Americans are
cognizable group), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); see also United States v. Ruiz, 894
F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir. 1990) (Hispanics are cognizable group); Roman v. Abrams, 822
F.2d 214, 227 (2d Cir. 1987) (whites are cognizable group), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052
(1989); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987) (Native Americans
are cognizable group). But see United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (appel-
lant did not offer sufficient evidence to establish Italian-Americans as cognizable group),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988). See generally infra note 95 (discussion of Fourteenth
Amendment's scope with respect to other groups).
69 See Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 95-96. The Second Circuit found that Italian-Americans "share
a common experience and culture, often share the same religious and culinary practices,
often have commonly identifiable surnames, and have been subject to stereotyping ... and
discrimination" sufficient to exist as a cognizable group under Batson. Id. at 96. But see
Murphy v. United States, 926 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir.) (Irish-Americans not cognizable group
for Batson purposes), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1102 (1991); United States v. Angiulo, 847
F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir.) (defendant's failure to show that Italian-Americans have been or
are currently subjected to discrimination negates cognizable group claim), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 928 (1988); Sgro, 816 F.2d at 33. The First Circuit in Sgro rejected the defendant's
generalized statements that Italian-Americans as an ethnic group held similar "ideas, atti-
tudes and experience." Id. Furthermore, the court seemed to take issue with the Second
Circuit's assertion in Biaggi that Italian-Americans had commonly identifiable surnames. Id.
"There was not a scintilla of evidence . . . that the undefined designation 'persons bearing
Italian-American surnames' . . . meets the test to establish a . . . cognizable class." Id.
Deciding ethnic status purely on the basis of surnames is at best speculative. See Mejia v.
State, 599 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Md. App. 1992). The assumption that a juror was Hispanic
because of his Spanish surname was undermined by the fact that thirty-nine million
Spaniards and fifty-eight million Filipinos have such surnames but are not Hispanic. Id.
Furthermore, married women often assume the ethnic-sounding names of their spouses. Id.
at 1214. "Did Rita Casini, for instance, cease to be Hispanic on the day she assumed the
name Rita Hayworth? Did Lucille Ball, on the other hand, become Hispanic whenever she
travelled as 'Mrs. Desi Arnaz?' " Id. The court in Mejia warned that such "unsubstantiated
labeling" could reduce Batson to "an ethnic parlor game." Id. at 1215.
With respect to certain ethnic and racial groups such as Hispanics and blacks, the court
may take judicial notice of their status as cognizable groups. See United States v. Alvarado,
891 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1989), cert, granted, judgment vacated, 110 S. Ct. 2995 (1990).
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members of the group such that the group's interests cannot be
adequately represented on the jury if the group is excluded." The
defendant may show that the Fourteenth Amendment has been
violated by the exercise of a race-based peremptory strike by as-
serting either his own equal protection rights7 1 or those of the
excluded juror.72 The Court has since held, in Powers v. Ohio,73
that defendants may raise the equal protection rights of excluded
jurors irrespective of the defendant's status in a cognizable
group.7' The Powers Court's rationale thus focused solely on the
excluded juror's membership in a cognizable group.75 Similarly,
Edmonson focused on the excluded jurors' rights to equal protec-
tion independent of the litigant's membership in a cognizable
group. As a consequence, a civil party's membership in a cogni-
zable group is probably irrelevant. 7
7
2. Other "Relevant Circumstances"
Under Batson, once cognizable group status has been estab-
lished, the defendant may put forth other circumstantial evidence
to raise an inference that peremptory strikes were motivated by
race.7 8 Application of this directive has led to significantly differ-
But with respect to other groups, for example whites, the trial court may call upon the
defense to establish cognizable group status factually at a hearing. Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 96;
see also United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 823-33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844
(1988). "Whether Italian-Americans comprise a group needing 'protection' from 'commu-
nity prejudices' is a 'question of fact'. The important consideration . . . is not whether a
number of people see themselves as forming a separate group, but whether others, by treat-
ing those people unequally, put them in a distinct group." Id. at 833 (quoting Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954)).
70 See Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 477-78. The Court found that the existence of a cognizable
group depended upon their distinctiveness in the community. Id. "[C]ommunity prejudices
are not static, and from time to time other differences from the community norm may
define other groups which need . . . protection. Whether such a group exists within a
community is a question of fact." Id. at 478.
71 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
7 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991).
73 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
74 Id. at 1373.
76 Id. at 1372.
76 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087.
77 Id. Justice Kennedy's opinion stated that the new Powers rule would apply to civil
cases. Id. "[W]e find the relation between the excluded venireperson and the litigant chal-
lenging the exclusion to be just as close in the civil context as in a criminal trial." Id.
78 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986); see infra note 80.
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ent approaches in the circuit courts in determining how convinc-
ing the circumstantial evidence must be to support such an infer-
ence.79 Some courts of appeals have required a pattern of strikes
against minority jurors. 80 Others have held that a single strike
against a minority juror raises an inference of discrimination.81
79 Id. The Batson court suggested instances where such "relevant circumstances" would
exist: "[A] pattern of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might
give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and state-
ments during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute
an inference of discriminatory purpose." Id. at 97. The Supreme Court also ruled that the
trial court bears the ultimate responsibility for determining whether a prima facie case has
been established. Id. "[T]rial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to
decide if the circumstances concerning . . . use of peremptory challenges creates a prima
facie case of discrimination. ... Id.
The Supreme Court recently confronted the issue of what constitutes a supportable in-
ference. See Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1868 (1991). "If a prosecutor artic-
ulates a basis for a peremptory challenge that results in the disproportionate exclusion of
members of a certain race, the trial judge may consider that fact as evidence that the prose-
cutor's stated reason constitutes a pretext for racial discrimination." Id.
The circuit courts have uniformly ruled that determination of a prima facie case of pur-
poseful discrimination should be treated as a finding of fact, "entitling the trial judge's
ruling to great deference on review and subjecting it to reversal only in the face of clear
error." United States v. Moore, 895 F.2d 484, 485 (8th Cir. 1990); see Riddick v. Edmis-
ton, 894 F.2d 586, 592 (3d Cir. 1990) (trial court fairly considered petitioner's claim);
United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 1988) (district court's findings must be
upheld unless clearly erroneous), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); United States v. Lance,
853 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1988) (accepting trial judge's credibility choice); United
States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1041 (4th Cir. 1988) (accepting trial court's finding of
no discrimination), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
'0 See United States v. Alvarado, 891 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 110 S. Ct. 2995 (1990). In Alvarado, the defendant contended that the prosecu-
tor's use of four of six peremptory challenges against minority jurors amounted to a minor-
ity challenge rate of sixty-seven per cent. Id. at 440. The court held that "statistical dispari-
ties are a relevant factor" in determining a prima facie case of discrimination, but that
since the number of challenges was small, the statistical anomaly is not as significant as
those in employment discrimination cases where "normally a larger universe is analyzed."
Id. at 444.
8 See United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1155-56 (3d Cir. 1989) (exclusion of
one black juror sufficient to establish prima facie case), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2623 (1990);
United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988).
"Striking a single black juror could constitute a prima facie case even when blacks ulti-
mately sit on the panel and even when valid reasons exist for striking other blacks." Id. at
747. This has been termed a "per se" rule and is followed in several other circuits. See
generally United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1489 (7th Cir.) (striking of single black
juror violated Equal Protection Clause even if other blacks are seated), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 173 (1990); United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); United
States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987) (same), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S.
1265 (1988); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987) (exclusion of
one juror could be sufficient to raise inference, but noting this may not always be ade-
quate). But see United States v. Grandison, 885 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 2178 (1990). Here, the court rejected the contention that a prima facie case arose each
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Still other courts have rejected a statistical approach altogether.82
B. Evaluating Race-Neutral Explanations
. The lack of precise criteria to evaluate racially neutral explana-
tions is perhaps the most unsettled aspect of the Batson and Ed-
monson holdings. 83 The initial determination has been left for the
trial judge to make on a case-by-case basis. 84 In jurisdictions where
time a black was peremptorily struck. Id. at 149. The court acknowledged that the district
court was not precluded from considering the composition of the resultant petit jury al-
though such data was "not dispositive." Id. at 147; United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103,
107 (4th Cir. 1989) (no per se rule exists to give rise to prima facie case of discrimination).
" See United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1988) (prosecu-
tor's use of six of seven challenges to exclude members of defendant's race while others
remained in venire did not support discriminatory finding); United States v. Sangineto-
Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1521 (6th Cir. 1988). In Sangineto-Miranda, the Sixth Circuit held
that a prosecutor's use of all his peremptory strikes against blacks did not show purposeful
discrimination. Id. at 1521. The court stated:
We reject such a per se rule, particularly because it does not take into account con-
siderations that may be very relevant, including the percentage of the racial group in
the district jury pool or original jury; the pattern of strikes exercised by the defense;
the number of strikes available to the government; and the composition of the jury
actually sworn.
Id. The court continued:
The Sixth Circuit attempted to formulate a statistical approach to the problem:
If ... the final jury sworn has a percentage of minority members that is significantly
less than the percentage in the group originally drawn for the jury ...then that
would be a factor pointing toward an inference of discrimination. If ... the percent-
age of minority members in the ultimate jury is the same or greater, that would be a
factor tending to negate the inference of discrimination.
Id. at 1521-22.
The Ninth Circuit has also concluded that the striking of two black veniremen does not
create an inference of discrimination. See United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987).
The statistical approach was criticized by the Third Circuit on other grounds. See United
States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 748 n.6 (3d Cir.) (observing that district with low minor-
ity population defendant would have difficulty proving discrimination where venire itself is
mostly non-black), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988). Such a result did occur in United
States v. David, 844 F.2d 767 (11 th Cir. 1988). Where, the court upheld the district court's
finding that the small number of blacks on the jury and the state's unused ability to strike
all black members of the venire did not establish a pattern of strikes. Id. at 768.
83 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). A race-neutral explanation "need not rise
to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." Id. The Court held, however, that
no valid explanation could be predicated on the assumption that shared race would lead to
partiality. Id. Nor could a prosecutor claim such strikes were made in good faith. Id. at 98.
The explanation must be sufficient to overcome the prima facie presumption of discrimina-
tion in the eyes of the trial judge. Id. This explanation should be "clear and reasonably
specific" to form legitimate motives for the peremptory strike. Id. at 98 n.20 (citing Texas
Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).
84 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. "Since the trial judge's findings ... will turn on evalua-
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the court participates in voir dire, those findings of whether a par-
ticular explanation was satisfactorily race-neutral have been ac-
corded "especial deference. ' 85 Appeals courts are loath to over-
turn such findings unless the trial court's findings are "clearly
erroneous."8 " As a result, cases decided since Batson reveal a vari-
ety of standards for determining acceptable race-neutral explana-
tions,8 7 including those based on facial expressions and "inappro-
priate gestures, '"88 those where the excluded juror had children
the same age as the defendant,89 and one where the prosecutor
claimed to always object to jurors whose profession began with the
letter "p."90
The Eighth Circuit, in contrast has articulated a test based upon
"comparability,"'" which compares the characteristics of the indi-
vidual peremptorily struck with those jurors not struck.92 When
tion of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference."
Id.: see also United Sates v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1990) (judge has obligation
to evaluate prosecutor's explanation in light of defendant's prima facie case): Sangineto-
Miranda, 859 F.2d at 1521. Th.e findings of the trial court must be upheld on appeal unless
they are found to be "clearly erroneous." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-
74 (1985).
88 Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 506 (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 96 (2d Cir.
1988)).
8" Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.
" See United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.) (upholding peremptory
strike where prosecutor perceived "poor attitude" from juror during voir dire), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987). The Ninth Circuit held that "a prosecutor may use peremptory
challenges when he cannot formulate and sustain a legal objection to a juror, and yet has
reason to question the impartiality of a juror due to his habits and associations." Id. at 457:
see also United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1988). But see United
States v. Sherrills, 929 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1991) (use of "subjective judgements" to
justify peremptory challenges is "particularly susceptible to the kind of abuse prohibited by
Batson"). Intuitive bases for peremptories were seemingly rejected by the Supreme Court
unless accompanied by a clear, specific reason. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20.
88 See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 506.
89 United States v. Alvarado, 891 F.2d 439, 441 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 110 S. Ct. 2995 (1990).
80 United States v. Romero-Reyna, 889 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1818 (1990). The court accepted this explanation despite the fact that the prosecutor did
not challenge a white production supervisor, payroll clerk and part-time secretary, Id. at
561.
81 See Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 511 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2795
(1991).
2 Id. at 510. The court in Reynolds explained that the characteristics of the individual
juror which prompted the strike cannot be present in those white venirepersons not struck.
Id.: see also United States v. Wilson, 853 F.2d 606, 610, vacated, 861 F.2d 514 (1988), affid
on reh'g, 884 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989). "[If the government strikes one prospective black
juror because of the cut of his or her clothing, this peremptory challenge will be suspect if
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seated jurors possess the characteristic used as grounds for pe-
remptorily striking another juror, the offered explanation will be
rejected as a mere pretext for discrimination. 93
Since the circuit courts have entertained different methods with
which to analyze peremptory challenges, the application of Batson
has been at best uneven. Consequently, pretextual explanations
and subtle discrimination may continue to flourish in the court-
room. It is suggested that the abolishment of the peremptory chal-
lenge is the only way to sweep discrimination out of the judicial
system.
the government allows white panel members with a similar cut of cloth to remain on the
panel." Id. But see Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 513-14 (8th Cir.) (black venire persons
struck for lack of education while whites with same education level accepted), cert. denied
sub nom. Jones v. Garrett, 484 U.S. 898 (1987).
The Ninth Circuit has also suggested use of the "comparability" test. See United States v.
Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 1987) (defense counsel able to point out to
court potential discrepancies in prosecution's use of peremptory strikes); cf United States
v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987) (reasons for striking blacks equally appli-
cable to whites were not "bona fide").
The "comparability" test was also used in the Second Circuit for determining a race-
neutral explanation in the context of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section require-
ment. See Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 219 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052
(1989). There, the court rejected the prosecutor's claim that knowledge of electronics,
bookkeeping, and computers could prevent a juror from accepting the reasonable doubt
standard, or that jurors with relatives in law enforcement community would vote against
conviction. Id. The circuit court concluded that the race-neutral explanations constituted
"a lot of lawyer circumlocution, folklore and cant, either unbelievably trivial and incredi-
ble, or pointing ...to the inescapable inference that the prosecution set out to skew the
jury selection .... " Id. at 220.
The district court record in Roman showed that ten out of eleven challenges had been
used against white jurors, who were the 'cognizable group' in this case. Roman v. Abrams,
608 F. Supp. 629, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1052 (1989). Furthermore, the reasons advanced for these challenges, such as a ju-
ror's relationship to a police officer, appeared pretextual because the record showed that
two empaneled jurors were relatives of police officers. Id. But see United States v. Lance,
853 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit affirmed a finding of no discriminatory
intent where the state, in providing a neutral explanation, stated criteria that if applied
evenly would have resulted in a white juror being struck. Id. at 1180. As a result, the court
sustained the strikes stating that it is proper for the prosecutor to use intuition as an expla-
nation for his decision. Id. at 1181. "[T]he vagarious process of choosing jurors need not
be controlled by a simple equation; it may be influenced by intuitive assumptions that are
not fatally suspect merely because they are not quantifiable." Id.
"' United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989).
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III. LIMITS ON THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE UNDER EQUAL
PROTECTION PRINCIPLES
In addition to the limits imposed by Batson and Edmonson on the
peremptory challenge, further restrictions may exist under equal
protection principles.9 Although the Batson court made it clear
that racially-motivated challenges violated the Equal Protection
Clause,9 5 it did not define the scope of this protection. As a result,
lower courts are divided as to whether Batson should extend be-
yond race-based peremptory challenges.9" Some courts take a nar-
row approach 97 and hold that Batson must be limited to its facts,
because the case did not explicitly state that equal protection prin-
" See United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990) (using equal pro-
tection analysis to extend Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges), rehr'g granted,
930 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1991); People v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 668, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130,
132 (Westchester County Ct. 1990) (using equal protection to analyze peremptory chal-
lenge of hearing-impaired juror); see, e.g., Chew v. State, 527 A.2d 332, 336 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1987), vacated, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989). "Although the ultimate reach of Batson still
lies shrouded in an unseen future, its choice of a constitutional predicate is loaded with
latent growth potential." Id.; see also O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 691 (5th Cir. 1982)
(exclusion of atheists from jury service violated Equal Protection Clause); Coleman v.
United States, 379 A.2d 951, 953-54 (D.C. 1977) (motion to exclude all Catholic jurors
from venire where Roman Catholic priests were plaintiffs on assumption they could not be
impartial violated equal protection); cf. People v. Viggiani, 105 Misc. 2d 210, 214, 431
N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (sexual preference not basis for
exercising challenge for cause under equal protection principles).
" See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1986). The central concern of the fram-
ers of the Constitution was to end governmental discrimination based on race. Id. at 97-98;
see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203 (1965) (core guarantee of Fourteenth
Amendment is prot.); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1800) (same). See gen-
erally JUDITH BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 57-72 (1983) (discussing original
intent of Fourteenth Amendment); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 341 (1949) (origins and application of Equal Protection
Clause).
Compare De Gross, 913 F.2d at 1422 (interpreting Batson to extend to gender-based
peremptory challenges) with United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Batson should be restricted to race-based peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
989 (1992). See generally Chew, 527 A.2d at 350. The Chew court noted that "[t]o hold that,
in the jury selection process, the equal protection clause is only available to black defend-
ants is philosophically indefensible." Id.
" See United States v. Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989) (Batsonlimited'to
race): United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1043 (4th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1069 (1990); cf State v. Pullen, 811 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Mo. App. 1991). In
Pullen, the court was confronted with the issue of whether Batson should extend to gender.
Id. at 465. Although the majority found "[no] grand distinction between race discrimina-
tion and gender discrimination that makes one less offensive than the other," they held to
Batson's "parameters of racial discrimination." Id. at 467; see State v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d
97, 106 (Ohio 1991) (same).
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ciples would apply to peremptory challenges beyond those based
on race.98 Consequently, these courts would most likely refuse to
apply Batson to strikes based on gender, religion, or sexual
preference."9
Other courts broadly interpret Batson as incorporating general
anti-discrimination principles," 0 -which potentially prohibit dis-
criminatory strikes against any constitutionally recognized
group. 01 It is suggested that since the foundation of Batson is the
Equal Protection Clause which protects all cognizable groups, the
broader approach is the correct interpretation of Batson.
A. The Equal Protection Analysis of Batson
Before equal protection principles are applied to a claim of dis-
crimination, there must be a showing that the discrimination is
invidious."0 2 This is explicit when a law is discriminatory on its
face,10 3 and it is then analyzed under conventional three-tiered
equal protection analysis04 which includes strict,0 5 middle-tier,106
99 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
" See supra note 97 and accompanying text (listing courts which refuse to extend Batson
beyond race).
100 See, e.g., Chew v. State, 527 A.2d 332, 346 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), vacated, 562
A.2d 1270 (1989). "It is by no means clear how the Batson opinion can rest exclusively on
the equal protection clause without incorporating general equal protection law principles."
Id.; United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 (Batson applies to challenges based on
religious affiliation), rehr'g en banc ordered, 948 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v.
De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990) (Batson applies to gender-based discrimina-
tion), rehr'ggranted, 930 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1991); People v. Irizzary, 165 A.D.2d 715, 716,
560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (1st Dep't 1990) (Batson applies to gender under state and federal
constitutions); People v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 668, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (Westches-
ter County Ct. 1990) (using equal protection to analyze peremptory challenge of hearing-
impaired juror); cf. People v. Viggiani, 105 Misc. 2d 210, 214, 431 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (sexual preference not basis for exercising challenge
for cause under equal protection principles).
101 See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1378 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent
admitted that the peremptory challenge is used to discriminate against "religion, sex, age,
political views, [and] economic status" in a way that would trigger unconstitutionality in
any other context. Id. The Batson dissent also noted that equal protection principles would
presumably prohibit the exclusion of jurors based on religious or political affiliation,
mental capacity, or profession." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
102 See, e.g., Chew, 527 A.2d at 334 (describing history and application of Equal Protec-
tion), vacated, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)
(same).
103 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
4 Id. (describing three tiers of equal protection analysis and application).
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and rational basis scrutiny. 10 7 In other instances, a law may be
facially neutral but administered in a discriminatory manner or
have a discriminatory impact.108 In such cases, the complaining
party has the burden of proving "purposeful discrimination" 10 9
before equal protection principles are applied. If the complainant
is successful, the burden then shifts to the state to "rebut the pre-
sumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible
racially neutral selection criteria . . . have produced the mono-
chromatic result."110
The Batson Court noted that peremptory challenges fell within
facially neutral parameters since the statute authorizing perempto-
ries was neutral. " The Court further noted that they could be
administered in a discriminatory manner.112 Accordingly, the bur-
den was on the complaining party to present a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination.1 1 3 Since facially neutral laws have been
found to be discriminatory on bases other than race, " 4 it is sub-
100 See infra note 116 (describing classifications which receive strict scrutiny).
101 See infra note 117 (describing classifications which receive heightened, or middle-tier,
scrutiny).
107 See infra note 118 (describing classifications receiving minimal scrutiny).
108 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (analyzing neutral recruiting pro-
cedures); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 360 (1886) (neutral statute requiring permits
to operate laundries applied in discriminatory fashion).
109 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977) (defendant had burden to
prove purposeful discrimination in selection of jury venire); Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev't Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (defendant has burden of persuasion
to prove purposeful discrimination where statute is facially neutral); Washington, 426 U.S.
at 240 (black applicants to police force had burden to prove purposeful discrimination in
administration of neutral statute which had disparate impact on black test-takers). The
"burden of proof" model was adopted from Title VII cases. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
110 Washington, 426 U.S. at 241 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632
(1972)).
... Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
11 See id. The Batson Court noted that equal protection violations may exist when "the
procedures implementing a neutral statute operate to exclude persons from the venire on
racial grounds." Id. at 88; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077,
2079 (1991) (peremptory challenge susceptible to abuse).
"' Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
" See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979). Feeney involved a
facially neutral statute which gave an absolute lifetime hiring preference to veterans for
civil service positions. Id. As a result, the majority of jobs went to men. Id. at 260. The
plaintiff, a female employed by the government, alleged the law violated equal protection.
Id. at 259. Although the Court determined that the statute had a discriminatory impact on
women, it did not find a showing of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 280-81.
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mitted that discriminatory challenges should likewise be found dis-
criminatory if based on religion, gender, or other cognizable char-
acteristics. It is submitted that the Batson approach does not
prohibit its expansion to other discriminatory strikes, but merely
sets forth the procedure to be followed before equal protection
principles are applied to peremptory challenges.
B. Expansion of Batson to Other Cognizable Groups Under Equal
Protection Principles
In the future, should courts apply conventional equal protection
principles to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the
requirements of presenting a prima facie case should remain the
same." 5 If discrimination is found to exist, then equal protection
principles should be applied."1 This would require the trial court
to determine the level of scrutiny applied to the cognizable group
in question." 7 Each cognizable group would receive a different
level of protection in accordance with its classification as either
suspect, 1 quasi-suspect, 19 or non-suspect. 2 ' The court would
"I See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (analyzing requirements of establishing
prima face case).
. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985). When a statute
classifies on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin, the law will receive strict scrutiny
from the court. Id. at 440. However, if a law classifies on the basis of gender, it will receive
a heightened judicial scrutiny. Id. Finally, if a law classifies on the basis of some non-suspect
classification such as age, the law need only meet a rational basis test in order to survive, Id.
at 441.
11I Id. at 440-42.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race is suspect classification). Besides
race, other classifications considered suspect include those based on alien status and ethnic
origin. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (classifications based on alien-
age are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny); Korematsu-v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944) (law based on ethnic origins or ancestry are suspect and subject to strict scru-
tiny); see also Regents Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (reverse discrimina-
tion admissions policy disfavoring whites is suspect). The Bakke Court characterized an af-
firmative action admissions policy as an "undeniabl[e] . . . classification based on race and
ethnic background." Id. at 289. See generally Kenneth Karst & Harold Horowitz, Affirmative
Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955, 965-66 (1974) (general discussion of appro-
priate level of scrutiny); Douglas R. Widin, Note, Suspect Classifications: A Suspect Analysis,
87 DICK. L REV. 407, 412-13 (1983) (giving standards to test whether class is suspect and
criticism of current standard).
"I See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (gender is quasi-
suspect group); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-81 (1979) (gender
is quasi-suspect category and law giving employment preference to veterans not discrimina-
tory to women under heightened scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (gen-
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then determine whether the interest in sustaining the peremptory
challenge is sufficient to outweigh the discrimination claim. 21 It is
der-based classifications are quasi-suspect and receive heightened scrutiny under middle
tier of equal protection).
Classifications based on illegitimacy are also accorded quasi-suspect status. See e.g.,
Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 293-96 (1979) (Social Security Act upheld which denied
survivors' benefits to illegitimate child using less demanding standard than strict scrutiny);
Matthew v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (acknowledged analysis to be in "this realm of
less than strictest scrutiny"); cf. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982) (invalidated
statute of limitations which limited time that illegitimate children had to bring paternity
suit). In Mills, the state interest in disallowing paternity claims was to prevent fraudulent or
stale claims. Id. at 92. The Court stated that "[s]uch restrictions will survive equal protec-
tion scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest." Id.
at 99.
Sexual preference should probably be a quasi-suspect classification, although courts have
classified it as suspect. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 728 (9th Cir.
1989) (homosexuals constitute suspect group), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990); Jantz v.
Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1538 (D. Kan 1991) (same). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 190 (1986) (no fundamental right to practice homosexual sodomy using rational basis
test); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (gay men
and women do not compromise suspect or quasi-suspect group), rehr'g denied, 909 F.2d 375
(9th Cir. 1990). For a thorough analysis of the topic, see EDITORS OF HARVARD LAW REVIEW,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (1990); Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the
Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57
S. CAL.. L. REV. 797, 812-821 (1984).
120 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (mentally retarded non-suspect group). "[Liegislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is ra-
tionally related to a state interest." Id. at 440. See generally Gary J. Simson, Note, Mental
Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974) (mental illness not suspect class as
determined by Supreme Court).
Distinctions based on age are also non-suspect. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct.
2395, 2397 (1991) (mandatory retirement law for judges over 70 upheld under rational
basis test); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (same);
Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (4th Cir.) (retirement age
of 50 upheld), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 147 (1989). But see Martin Levine, Comments on the
Constitutional Law of Age Discrimination, 57 CHI KENT. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1981) (urging
age discrimination be treated as suspect).
Discrimination based on youth has primarily been an issue in jury selection cases. See
Donald H. Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 76 MICH. L. REV.
1045, 1049-61 (1978). Jury challenges based on age are permitted. See infra note 152 and
accompanying text (cases involving age-based challenges).
121 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 125 (1986) (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (discussing
interest in peremptory challenge). Balancing the state interest in various laws is a crucial
part of the equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1976)
(per curiam) (state had compelling interest in limiting political contributions to campaigns);
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973) (per curiam) (residency requirements upheld
due to state's compelling interest in preventing fraudulent voter lists); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (government's interest in keeping Japanese-Americans in
isolation during wartime sufficiently compelling). But see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
343 (1972) (government interest in preventing fraudulent voting procedures not enough to
justify infringement on right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969)
(state had no compelling interest in putting limits on welfare recipient's benefits); Mc-
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submitted that an analysis of this interest is essential in determin-
ing when, if ever, a discriminatory peremptory challenge should
be sustained.
Historically, the peremptory challenge was thought to be "es-
sential" to a fair trial by jury.' Its purpose of assembling a fair
and impartial jury'" was presumably achieved by allowing parties
to exclude, without explanation, those jurors whom they believed
were biased based upon intangible and "sudden impressions." '"24
If used in this fashion, the challenge would legitimately serve its
purpose by eliminating biased jurors from the jury.
Although the interest of a party in obtaining a fair and impar-
tial jury is clear, it is questionable whether peremptory challenges
actually further this interest."2 5 It is submitted that when chal-
lenges are used to dismiss jurors based upon stereotypes or pre-
sumed group bias, they do not meet the goal of assembling a fair
and impartial jury, but instead meet the attorney's goal of creat-
ing a biased jury.
Batson essentially held that the interest in race-based peremp-
tory challenges was not compelling enough to survive the strict
scrutiny of the court.'26 However, the issue of whether this inter-
est should survive an equal protection claim based on characteris-
Laughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (state had no compelling interest in enforc-
ing racially discriminatory miscegenation and cohabitation law).
12I See Batson, 476 U.S. at 125 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)).
123 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22 (historically, peremptory challenge has served in selection
of impartial jury); see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965) (peremptory challenge
allows parties to obtain fair and impartial jury); Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408
(1894) (defendant's peremptory is one of most important rights given to accused).
14 See supra note 6' and accompanying text (description of peremptory challenges).
125 See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1372 (1991).
126 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99. However, in his dissent, the Chief Justice discussed the
state's interest in preserving the peremptory challenge, and stated that "[u]nder conven-
tional equal protection principles, a state interest of this magnitude and ancient lineage
might well overcome an equal protection objection to the application of peremptory chal-
lenges." Id. at 125 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent also observed that "the state in-
terest involved here has historically been regarded by this Court as substantial, if not com-
pelling." Id.
The Ninth Circuit disagrees with this analysis. In De Gross, the court balanced the inter-
est of the government in exercising a peremptory challenge and concluded that they were
"not substantially related to achieving an impartial jury." United States v. De Gross, 913
F.2d 1417, 1422 (1990), rehr'g granted, 930 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1991). For a general discus-
sion of the difficulties in measuring the state interest, see Lawrence G. Sager, Some Observa-
tions About Race, Sex, and Equal Protection, 59 TUL. L. REV. 928, 932-42 (1985).
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tics other than race is one that must still be resolved. 127 If the
challenge is directed against a quasi-suspect group, the interest
must be deemed "substantially related to achieving an important
government objective". Similarly, if the challenge is directed
against non-suspect individuals, the challenge must be rationally
related to that interest in order to be sustained. 29 The following
sections suggest how these issues may be resolved in the future.
1. Suspect Classifications
Suspect classifications, including those based on race and ethnic
origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. 3 ' Batson and Edmonson have
already determined that the interest in exercising discriminatory
peremptory challenges against suspect groups is not "compelling"
enough to outweigh their equal protection claims.'' Application
127 See supra note 95.
122 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The concurring opinion acknowledged
its use of a different analysis, but stated "while I would not endorse ... a further subdivid-
ing of equal protection analysis, candor compels the recognition that the relatively deferen-
tial rational basis standard of review . . . takes on a sharper focus when we address a gen-
der-based classification." Id. at 210 (Powell, J., concurring); see also supra note 119, and
accompanying text (description of quasi-suspect groups).
19 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (law
classifying by age not suspect and upheld under rational basis test); see also supra note 117,
and accompanying text (description of non-suspect groups).
"' See United States v. Carolene Prod., Inc., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). "[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
Although classifications based on alienage are suspect, they have not received protection
in the context of jury selection. See United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 976-77
(5th Cir. 1975) (aliens have no right to serve as juror); Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134,
138-39 (D. Md. 1974) (same), affd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976). Perkins involved a claim by a
resident alien who objected to the exclusion of aliens from jury service. Id. at 134. The
Maryland District Court, using a rational basis test, ruled that there are situations "where
citizenship bears some rational relationship" to qualifications for jury service. Id. at 138
(citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 339 F. Supp. 906, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Lumbard, J., concur-
ring)). The court stated that since jury service "goes to the heart of representative govern-
ment", it "may fairly be concluded that [citizens] as a class . . . are more likely to make
informed and just decisions . . . than are non-citizens." Id. at 136; see also Foley v. Connel-
lie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978) (state police have rational basis for excluding aliens from
police force). See generally Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory
Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SuP. CT. REv. 275 (1977) (justification for aliens
receiving suspect classification).
... See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2077 (1991); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986); see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492 (1977)
(exclusion of suspect group from venire based on ethnic origin violates Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (same); Strauder v. West Virginia,
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to other groups 3 ' depends on whether they can sufficiently prove
cognizable group status.'3 3 In addition, it is suggested that pe-
remptory challenges exercised against a group based upon reli-
gious affiliation, which is clearly a cognizable group, should be
deemed "suspect" and receive the strict scrutiny of the courts. 34
2. Quasi-Suspect Classifications
Although the category of "quasi-suspect" groups is not fully de-
fined, it has been held to encompass such classifications as gen-
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (exclusion of blacks from jury venire denial of equal protection).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1399 (10th Cir. 1991) (Native Ameri-
cans cognizable group for Batson purposes), cert. denied, No. 91-6705, 1992 WL 39056
(U.S., Feb. 24, 1992); United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 86, 96 (2d. Cir. 1988) (Batson
applicable to Italian-Americans), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); Commonwealth v. Ga-
gnon, 449 N.E.2d 686, 692 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (French-Canadians are cognizable group
for Batson purposes). But see Murphy v. United States, 926 F.2d 50, 55 (1st Cir.) (Irish-
Americans not cognizable group for Batson purposes), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1102 (1991);
United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 1988) (Batson does not apply to
Italian-Americans), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989); United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30
(1st Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988).
"I' See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing test for proving cognizable
group status).
"' See O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 691 (5th Cir. 1982) (atheists deemed "suspect"
group whose exclusion from jury service violated state's equal protection clause). The
O'Hair Court noted that not only does the Fourteenth Amendment reach class exclusions
based on race, but " 'all other exclusions which single out any class of persons for different
treatment not based on some reasonable classification.' " Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954)). The Fifth Circuit has also addressed the possible exclusion of
Jewish jurors based on alternate theories of race and religion. United States v. Greer, 939
F.2d 1076, 1086 n.9 (5th Cir.), rehr'g en banc ordered, 948 F.2d 934 (1991). The court
noted "[w]hether Jewish jurors are viewed as members of a 'race' or a religion, a defend-
ant's exercise of peremptory challenges against them is subject to Batson's strictures." Id.
(citation omitted). In Greer, defendants were members of a white supremacist group known
as the Hammerskins which advocated the separation of races and anti-Semitism. Id. at
1081. Defendants were convicted of beating minorities and vandalizing Jewish temples and
businesses. Id. at 1082-83. After their conviction, they claimed the trial court erred in not
allowing their motion to dismiss all Hispanic, black, and Jewish jurors for cause. Id. at
1084. The court cited Edmonson and noted that "even if the defendants had learned which
prospective jurors were Jewish, they constitutionally could not have based their peremp-
tory challenges upon this information, for the Supreme Court has sought to eliminate ra-
cial and ethnic discrimination in the process of jury selection." Id. at 1085; see also Cole-
man v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 953 (D.C. 1977) (court denied motion to exclude
Roman Catholic venirepersons from jury based on assumption they could not be impartial
to priest-plaintiffs). The Coleman Court stated that "mere potentiality for bias based on
religious affiliation cannot justify the elimination of a prospective juror." Id.; Cooper v.
Pate, 382 F.2d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1967) (strict scrutiny applied to religious-based equal
protection claim); People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 277, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (systematic exclusion of Jewish jurors violates state constitution).
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der 1 5 and sexual preference."' Such classifications are afforded a
"heightened scrutiny," with the state having to show a substantial
interest between the classification and an important government
objective.1 37 It is submitted that since the interest in such chal-
lenges is not substantially related to obtaining a fair and impartial
jury,' 31 individuals in quasi-suspect groups should be afforded the
right to invoke equal protection analysis in the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges.
a. Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges
Lower courts are split on whether to protect gender-based pe-
remptory challenges. 9 In United States v. Hamilton,'40 the Fourth
Circuit held that peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of
gender were not covered by the equal protection principles in Bat-
son." ' The court followed a narrow interpretation, and held that
"I See infra note 137 and accompanying text (cases involving gender-based
discrimination).
"' See infra note 149 and accompanying text (cases involving sexual preference).
... See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (substantial relation-
ship test).
138 United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422 (1990), rehr'g granted, 930 F.2d 695
(9th Cir. 1991) (no substantial relationship between impartial jury and gender-based pe-
remptory challenge).
138 See United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991) (will not extend
Batson to gender), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 989 (1992); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d
1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990). But see De Gross, 913
F.2d at 1422 n.8 (extending Batson to gender).
State courts seem to be similarly split. See Stariks v. State, 572 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1990) (will not extend Batson): State v. Crowder, 515 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987) (same); Hannan v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Ky. Ct. App.
1989) (same); State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989) (same). For courts
agreeing with the Ninth Circuit position, see Ex parte Dysart, 581 So. 2d 545, 546-47 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991) (Maddox, J., dissenting); State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 848 (Haw.
1990).
New York courts have also extended Batson to gender-motivated peremptories, holding
them violative of the equal protection clauses under the state and federal constituiions. See
People v. Irizzary, 165 A.D.2d 715, 716, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (1st Dep't 1990); People
v. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d 86, 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93 (2d Dep't 1990); see also People v. Mer-
kle, 143 A.D.2d 145, 146, 531 N.Y.S.2d 601, 602 (2d Dep't.), appeal denied, 73 N.Y.2d
858, 534 N.E. 2d 342, 537 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1024 (1989). The
Irizzary court expressly noted that "although the issue of gender-based discrimination has
not been squarely addressed by the Supreme Court, the People concede that the trial court
correctly held [Batson] principles to apply." Jrizzary, 165 A.D.2d at 716, 560 N.Y.S.2d at
280.
140 Hamilton, 850 F.2d at 1042.
141 Id. "While we do not applaud the striking of jurors for any reason relating to group
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since Batson only addressed the issue of race, it was limited to its
facts." 2 The court considered the utility of the peremptory chal-
lenge so great as to warrant the overruling of a challenge admit-
tedly based on gender.14
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. De Gross,"14 came to the
opposite conclusion when it balanced the value of the peremptory
challenge against equal protection principles.1 45 In De Gross, the
government objected to a female criminal defendant using her
peremptories to exclude men from the jury.14' The circuit court
opinion emphasized the Fourteenth Amendment's protection
against all types of discrimination based on stereotypes such as
race or gender, 147 and concluded that Batson extended beyond
race." 8 The court used a conventional equal protection approach,
and analyzed the challenges using heightened scrutiny,"9 finding
no substantial relationship between the use of such challenges and
the goal of achieving an impartial jury.' 5
b. Challenges Based on Sexual Preference
Although courts have had difficulty classifying sexual prefer-
ence into one category,' 5 it is submitted that discrimination based
classifications, we find no authority to support an extension of Batson to instances other
than racial discrimination." Id.
"I' Id. at 1042-43.
143 Id.
1,4 United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422 (1990), rehr'g granted, 930 F.2d 695
(9th Cir. 1991).
145 Id. at 1419.
"I Id. at 1422 n.8.
147 Id. at 1422.
148 Id.
I" Id. at 1422.
180 Id. at 1422-23. The De Gross court acknowledged that peremptory challenges are a
"necessary means for achieving the important governmental objective of impaneling a fair
and impartial jury." Id. However, they went on to note that:
[Clhallenges explained by .. .gender are not based on a party's sudden impression
of a particular venireperson's ability to be impartial. Rather, like racial challenges,
they are based either on the false assumption that members of a certain group are
unqualified to serve as jurors, or on the false assumption that members of certain
groups are unable impartially to consider the case against a member or a non-mem-
ber of their group.
Id. (citation omitted)
181 See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 728 (9th Cir. 1988) (homosexuals
are suspect group), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543,
1551 (D. Kan. 1991) (same). But see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance
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upon sexual orientation belongs in the quasi-suspect class. Accord-
ingly, those courts which classify sexual preference as a quasi-sus-
pect classification should protect those individuals from discrimi-
natory challenges, since no substantial interest is served by
excluding jurors on this basis.152 Although the expansion of Bat-
son to quasi-suspect groups will restrict the use of the peremptory
challenge even further, it is proposed that the extension is neces-
sary to prevent discrimination from tainting the trial process.
53
3. Non-Suspect Groups
The non-suspect category includes classifications based on
age15 and disability. 55 For these groups, the interest in exercising
Office, 895 F.2d 563 (homosexuals do not comprise either suspect or quasi-suspect group),
rehr'g denied, 909 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Webster, 769 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C.
1991) (homosexuals are non-suspect and judged according to rational basis test).
Classifications based on sexual preference continue to be relevant in certain areas. See
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (sexual preference relevant to service in mili-
tary), rehr'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439,
1442 (5th Cir. 1983) (relevant for purposes of immigration), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219
(1984): Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (relevant to determine fitness of parent
regarding custody of children); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340
(Wash. 1977) (sexual preference relevant to fitness to teach), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879
(1977). But see Robert C. Farrell, Equality, Classification, and Irrelevant Characteristics, 12 VT.
L. REV. 11, 46-54 (1988). "Sexual preference is an irrelevant characteristic, because each of
the justifications offered to demonstrate its relevance - the criminal law, religious pre-
cept, morality and decency, and public hostility - is devoid of merit and unacceptable
under our constitutional scheme." Id. at 54. See generally Note, The Constitutional Status of
Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1305
(1985) (because homosexuals have historically been victims of discrimination, legislation
affecting them should be subject to strict scrutiny).
162 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (citing cases which apply heightened scru-
tiny to quasi-suspect class).
"' See People v. Viggiani, 105 Misc. 2d 210, 214, 431 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. N.Y. County 1980). The Viggiani case held that a challenge for cause based upon the
prospective juror's sexual preference was unconstitutional. Id. The assumption on the part
of the defendant that the juror would be biased was deemed a denial of equal protection
under the state constitution. Id. The court concluded it would be "a divisive assumption
that justice may turn on sexual preference." Id.
"' See supra note 120 and accompanying text. For age discrimination in jury selection,
see United States. v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 1990) (age of juror is legiti-
mate reason to strike), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991); United States. v. Moreno, 878
F.2d 817, 820-21 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979 (1989); cf. LaRoche v. Perrin,
718 F.2d 500 (1st Cir. 1983) (young are identifiable group for Sixth Amendment pur-
poses); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 137-38 (same), rehr'g denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974).
For cases involving age-based peremptory challenges, see United States v. Ferguson, 935
F.2d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1991) (upheld peremptory challenges based on age), cert. denied,
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a discriminatory peremptory challenge must be shown to be ra-
tionally related to the goal of assembling a fair and impartial
jury.'56 Although it could be argued that the interest in achieving
an impartial jury is rationally related to the exercise of discrimina-
tory challenges, it remains difficult to reconcile an act done "arbi-
trarily" with a rationally-related test.157 However, it is submitted
that if the use of the peremptory challenge is to be continued in
the future, it should be limited at this point to preserve what is
left of the peremptory's power. Accordingly, the striking of non-
suspect jurors should not be subject to review.
Although it is tempting to retain the peremptory challenge,
even in a reduced capacity, it is submitted that in light of its possi-
ble expansion under equal protection principles in both the crimi-
nal and civil context, the judicial process would be better served
by eliminating peremptory challenges completely.
112 S. Ct. 907 (1992); United States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527, 1540 (8th Cir. 1990)
(age-based peremptory challenges do not implicate Batson), cert. denied sub nom. Giuffrida v.
United States, Ill S. Ct. 971 (1991); United States v. McCoy, 848 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir.
1988) (same): see also United States v. Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989)
(although defendant objected to peremptories directed at all jurors under age 25, court
concluded Batson only applied to race): State v. Everett, 472 N.W.2d 864 (Minn. 1991)
(court analyzed case as if Batson applied to age-based peremptories, but found defendant
failed to make prima facie case).
In New York, the court of appeals has ruled that age goes to one's ability to serve as a
juror. See People v. Foster, 64 N.Y.2d 1144, 1145, 480 N.E.2d 340, 341, 490 N.Y.S.2d
726, 727 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 857 (1985).
"'See People v. Green, 148 Misc. 2d 666, 668, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (Westchester
County Ct. 1990) (peremptory challenge based solely on hearing-impairment violated ju-
ror's equal protection rights under state constitution); cf People v. Guzman, 76 N.Y.2d 1,
6-7, 556 N.Y.S.2d 7, 10-11, 555 N.E.2d 259, 262-63 (1990) (denial of defendant's chal-
lenge for cause not error where there was evidence deaf juror could carry out juror du-
ties). But see Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235, 1245 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (statutes prohibit-
ing hearing impaired from jury service not unconstitutional because potential
communication problems exist with fellow jurors during deliberations). See generally Harold
Manson, Jury Selection: The Courts, the Constitution, and the Deaf 11 PAC. L.J. 967, 982-88
(1980) (deaf persons are suspect group and should be accorded strict scrutiny).
1' Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-46 (1985) (minimal scru-
tiny applied to zoning law which discriminated against mentally retarded).
I" See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief
Justice noted the difficulty, if not impossibility, of applying a "rational" equal protection
analysis to an "arbitrary and capricious" right. Id. He stated, "[a] clause that requires a
minimum 'rationality' in government actions has no application to an 'arbitrary and capri-
cious right.' " Id.
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CONCLUSION
The unfettered use of peremptory challenges has traditionally
been regarded as essential to the right to a fair and impartial
jury. 158 However, because they are exercised without a reason, pe-
remptory challenges are often susceptible to discriminatory abuse.
Such challenges are premised on the pernicious stereotype that
presumes an inherent group bias among jurors who belong to a
recognizable group. Consequently, discriminatory peremptory
challenges serve to remove otherwise qualified jurors, thereby
tainting the judicial process and possibly resulting in an unfair and
partial jury.
The application of Batson to civil actions indicates that the
Court has recognized that the challenge must yield to the consti-
tutional requirements of equal protection. The recent cases of Ed-
monson and Powers, combined with a potential expansion to other
cognizable groups will so dilute the effectiveness of the peremp-
tory challenge, that it should be abolished in order to eradicate
discrimination from the courtroom. The right to a fair and impar-
tial jury is best served by abolishing the challenge outright, rather
than allowing discrimination to continue under the uneven pro-
tection of Batson and Edmonson.
Gerald A. Bunting & Lesley A. Reardon
1s8 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 212, 219-21 (1965); see supra note 123.
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